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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

A. PHARIS JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant

vs.

Case No. 7667

DAVID BANKHEAD, Auditor of
Tooele County, Utah,
Defendant and Respondent

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, as county attorney of Tooele County, brought
this action to get a judicial declaration that as a matter of
law he was and is entitled to the sum of $3500 per year as
the maximum salary allowed for the office of attorney in
counties of the second class under the provisions of Section
19-13-14, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter
34, Laws of Utah 1945, rather than the sum of $1800 per year,
3
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the salary fixed for that office by the board of commissioners
of Tooele County, and also to receive the difference for the
years 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950.
Because the issues involve matters of vital public concern, and raise certain constitutional questions as well as the
fact that the plaintiff, as county attorney of Tooele County,
has an interest in the matter adverse to that of other county
officials, the Attorney General, at the request of the Auditor
of Tooele County, has undertaken to represent the defendant.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that it did not state a claim against defendant upon
which relief could be granted, and also because it failed to
join certain indispensible parties. Upon argument of the
motion it was stipulated that the matter go immediately to
pre-trial, and upon pre-trial it was stipulated that the issues
be narrowed to the following questions of law:

( 1) Can the county commissioners of a county fix a
salary for a county officer at a figure less than the maximum
shown in Section 19-13-14, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as
amended?
(2) If the answer to the above is "No," then can plaintiff
recover additional salary for the years 1947, 1948, 1949, and
1950, or for any part thereof?
Upon the formulation of these issues, each party moved
for judgment on the pre-trial order and after argument the
court denied plaintiff's motion, granted defendant's motion
and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It is from this
order that plaintiff appeals.
4
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It was stipulated by and between the parties, and so set
forth in the pre-trial order that the plaintiff is and ever since
January, 1947, has been the county attorney of Tooele County,
that during all of this time Tooele County was a county of
the second class, and that plaintiff's salary as county attorney
as fixed by the board of county commissioners for the year
1946 and subsequently has been the sum of $1800 per year.
No issue has been raised as to any technical defects in the
action of the board of commissioners in fixing the annual
salary of plaintiff, as county attorney, at $1800 as was the
situation in the case of .Nliller v. White, 70 U 145, 258 Pac. 565
and Price t'. Tuttle, 70 U 156, 258 Pac. 1016. Abuse of discretion by the Board of County Commissioners in fixing the
sum of $1800 per year as the salary for the county attorney
is not an issue in the appeal of this case.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The action of the board of county commissioners of

Tooele County in fixing the salaries for the various
county officers was proper and in accordance with the
constitution and laws of the state.
II. If the action of the board of county commissioners of
Tooele County in fixing the salaries of the various
county officers was not authorized, then the plaintiff,
as county attorney, is not entitled to a salary because
none has been prescribed.
5
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ARGUMENT

I
THE ACTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TOOELE COUNTY IN FIXING THE
SALARIES FOR THE V ARlO US COUNTY OFFICERS WAS
PROPER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE STATE.
It is generally recognized that in the absence of some constitutional prohibition or limitation the power or duty to fix
the compensation of county officers may be vested in the governing body of the county. See 43 Am. Jur. 138, where a concise statement of the general rule is as follows:

The power to fix the compensation of public offivers is not inherently and exclusively legislative in
character. Unless the Constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits the legislature from doing so, it may
delegate the power to other governmental bodies or
officers, as, for example, to the governor, to counties,
to cities, to courts or judges, or to other officers or
official boards.
Also, in 20 CJS 917 the general rule is said to be:
Subject to any limitations imposed by the state constitution, the power or duty to fix the compensation of
county officers or agents may be vested in the county
board or similar body, and in some jurisdictions, compensation· or salaries not fixed by law should be fixed
by the county board.
It is respectfully submitted that appellant, in citing various
cases in his brief to the effect that the legislature alone is
authorized by the constitution to fix salaries of county officers,
6
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and that an attempted delegation of this power is of no force
and effect, has failed to note the differences in the constitu~
tional provisions of the various states. The Arizona cases
cited by the plaintiff involve an interpretation of section 4
of Article 12 of the Constitution of the State of Arizona providing as follows:

* * * The board of supervisors of each county is
hereby empowered to fix salaries for all county and
precinct officers within such county for whom no compensation is prouided by law, and the salaries so fixed
shall remain in full force and effect until changed by
law. (Italics added.)
The power of the board of supervisors to fix salaries under
this section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of
Arizona as being temporary and exercisable only during the
period between admission to statehood and proper action by
the state legislature. See Patty v. Greenlee County, 14 Ariz.
422, 130 Pac. 757; Hunt v. l\1ohave County, 18 Ariz. 480, 162
Pac. 600; Santa Cruz County v. McKnight, 20 Ariz. 103, 177
Pac. 256, Board of Supvs v. Stephens, 20 Ariz. 115, 177 Pac.
261; State Consol. Pub. tJ. Hill, 39 Ariz. 21, 3 P 2d525; and
Ross v. Cochise County, 20 Ariz. 167, 177 Pac. 931.
The applicable constitutional provision of the State of
Utah in section 1, Article XXI, does not provide that the compensation of county officers shall be rrprovided by law" as
does the provision of the Arizona constitution, but merely that
"All * * * county officers * * * shall be paid fixed and
definite salaries * * ." The constitution of the State of Utah
on the other hand does provide in section 10, Article VIII that
" * * * The powers and duties of County Attorneys * * * shall
7
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be prescribed by law." (Italics added.) However, it is the
salary and not the powers and duties of the county attorney
with which we are concerned in this case. Furthermore,
Burgess v. Apache County, 20 Ariz. 140, 177 Pac. 269; Graham
County v. Alger, 20 Ariz. 147, 177 Pac. 272; and Graham
County v. Smith, 20 Ariz. 145, 177 Pac. 271; cited by the
appellant are not in point at all because they deal with the
statute of limitations applicable to a claim for back salaries
of officers rather than the question of the delegation of power
to fix the salaries.

Again, in the California cases cited by appellant, the
courts were dealing with a constitutional provision entirely
different from the one in the State of Utah. Section 5, Article
XI of the Constitution of the State of California provides:
The legislature, by general and uniform laws, shall
provide for the election or appointment, in the several
counties, of * *. * and such other county, township,
and municipal officers as public convenience may require, and shall prescribe their duties and fix their
term of office. It shall regulate the compensation of
all such officer.r * * * . (Italics added.)
In interpreting the above quoted constitutional provisions in
Arnold v. Sullenger, 200 Cal. 632, 254 Pac. 267, which held
invalid an attempt to delegate to the board of supervisors the
power to fix the compensation of the county surveyor, the
Supreme Court of California had this to say:
Section 5 of Article 11 of the Constitution provides
that the Legislature by general and uniform law shall
"regulate the compensation of all such officers," which
includes county officers. * * * An examination of
8
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the cases in this state, and particularly those above
cited, clearly indicates that the word "regulate" has
always been deemed to mean "to fix" or "to establish,"
and no other signification may now properly be attached to that word in the connection in which it is so employed in this section of the Constitution.
Thus, because of the vast differences in constitutional provisions, the California cases likewise are of no help to appellant in support of his unqualified assertion that the legislature alone is authorized by the constitution to fix salaries of
county officers and that an attempted delegation of this power
is of no force and effect. The cases cited by appellant are
in line with those wherein constitutional provisions require the
legislature to prescribe the compensation of .county officers and
the courts uniformly hold that under such provisions the
legislature cannot delegate its power to any individual, officer
or board. See also in this connection section 27, Article 3
of the constitution of the State of Florida wherein it is provided "The Legislature shall provide for the election * * *
of all state and county officers * * * and fix by law their duties
and compensation." And Section 4, Article 16 of the Constitution of Arkansas wherein it is provided that "The General
Assembly shall fix the salaries and fees of all officers in the
state * * * " together with the cases of State v. Spencer, 81
Fla. 211, 87 So. 634 and Pulaski County v. Caple, 191 Ark.
340, 86 SW 2d 4, interpreting those constitutional provisions.
Where there are no constitutional prohibitions or limitations, as is the case in the State of Utah, the power and duty
to fix the compensation of county officers may be and is generally delegated to the governing body of the county. In addi9
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tion to the general authorities cited above, see also Huffaker
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 54 Idaho 715, 35 P 2d 261;
Dygert v. Board of Commissioners of Caribou County, 64 Idaho
161, 129 P 2d 660; Reynolds v. Board of Comm'rs., 6 Idaho
787, 59 Pac. 7~·0; Dew v. Ashley County, 199 Ark. 361, 133
SW 2d 652, citing RCL; State v. Nolte, 351 Mo. 271, 172
SW 2d 854; Arnett v. State, 168 Ind. 180, 80 NE 153, 8 LRA
(NS) 1192; Throckmorton County v. Thompson, 131 Tex.
543, 115 SW 2d 1102; Sarlis v. State, 201 Ind. 88, 166 NE
270, 67 ALR 718; State v. Darby, 345 Mo. 1002, 137 SW 2d
532; Coleman v. Jackson County, 349 Mo. 255, 160 SW 2d
691; Stephens v. Mills County (Tex. Civ. App.) 113 SW 2d
944; Nacogdoches County v. Winder (Tex. Civ. App.) 140
sw 2d 972.
It is also generally held that the power to pay salaries
not exceeding a certain prescribed maximum necessarily implies the power to pay less than the prescribed maximum. In
Coleman v. Jackson, 349 Mo. 255, 160 SW 2d 691, the Supreme
Court of Missouri said:

The last
forbidding
more than
the power

clause of the quoted portion of the section
the court to pay such county employees
the rates fixed by statute obviously implies
to pay them less than the statutory rate

***
In Stephens v. Mills County (Tex. Civ. App.) 113 SW
2d 944, the Supreme Court of Texas had this to say:
The language is also within the rule announced by
the decisions, that the commissioners' court may fix
the maximum fees to be returned by the county treasurer at a sum less than the statutory maximum * * * ."
10
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Also in Throckmorton County v. Thompson, 131 Tex. 543,
115 SW 2d 1102, the Supreme Court of Texas said:
The order of the commissioners' court fixing the
compensation of the County Treasurer of Throckmorton County on a commission basis for a maximum
amount o{ less than that fixed by a statute is a valid
exercise of authority conferred on such court by the
Constitution and statutes of this state.
The Supreme Court of Idaho in Reynolds v. Board of
Comm~rs., 6 Idaho 787, 59 Pac. 730, upheld the action of the
Board of Commissioners even though it felt the board had
fixed the salaries in question extremely low. In the course
of its opinion the court had this to say about the amount
of compensation to be paid county officers:
It is not the policy of the law, the wish of the
people, or in the interest of public economy that
the compensation of county officials should be
placed on a niggardly footing, totally inadequate
to the decent administration of public affairs. Neither
is it the policy that these officials should be allowed extravagant salaries, beyond all reason. But
the intention of the legislature was that the boards
of county commissioners in the various counties should
take into consideration the work and time consumed
in the various offices, the expense connected with the
same, the self-sustaining revenue therefrom, the responsibilities attached thereto, the bonds under which
the parties are placed, and all the circumstances and
conditions connected therewith, and from all these
determine what would be a proper and just compensation for their services.
In holding that the exercise of discretion of the board of commissioners in fixing the salaries of county officers is not sub11
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jete to review except in those cases when a clear abuse of discretion is shown, that same court had this to say in Huffaker
v. Board of County Commissioners, 54 Idaho 715, 3·5 P 2d
261:
The responsibility of determining a just and sufficient salary, taking into consideration the laudable
desire for legitimate economies, adequate service to
the county and public, just compensation to the employee and due regard for the rights and interest of
the taxpayer, rests on the board, subject to control by
the courts for abuse, and the evidence herein does not
show the board has in this case overstepped the bounds
of a reasonable discretion.
In the case of Hall et al v. Beveridge, 81 Ill. Rep. 128,
Section 10 of Article 10 of the constitution of 1870 of the
State of Illinois, authorized the county board to fix the
salaries of county officers at not more per annum than $1500
in counties not exceeding 20,000 inhabitants; $2,000 in counties between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants; and $2500 in
counties between 30,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. In a county
containing more than 30,000 and not exceeding 50,000 inhabitants, the board had fixed the clerk's salary at $1500. It
was contended that the board had no lawful authority to fix
the salary at less than $2,000 and hence the action of the board
was void. The contention in that case is similar to the contention inferred by the appellant in this case. In disposing of
the matter, however, the Supreme Court had this to say about
the power of the board to fix the salary of the clerk:
No minimum is imposed by the express words ot
the section, and we find nothing in the section from
which it can properly be regarded as implied. Full
12
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power to fix the compensation of county officers is
given to the county board, with certain limitations expressed in the section. We find nothing in these limitations forbidding the fixing of the salary of this clerk
at $1500.
In view of the constitutional provision in section 10,
Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah, providing
that
* * * The powers and duties of County Attorneys,
and such other attorneys for the State as the Legislature may provide, shall be prescribed by law. * * *
appellant urges that the county attorney is a state rather than
a county officer and that his salary must, therefore, be fixed by
the State Legislature. However, the Constitution does not
so provide and section 19-13-2 Utah Code Annotated 1943,
provides as follows:
The officers of a county are: Three county commissioners, a county treasurer, a sheriff, a county clerk,
a county auditor, a county recorder, a county attorney,
a county surveyor, a county assessor, and such others
as may be provided by law; provided, that in counties
having an assessed valuation of less than $20,000,000
the county clerk shall be ex officio auditor of the county
and shall perform the duties of such office without
extra compensation therefor. (Italics added.)

It is respectfully submitted that the county attorney is a "county
officer," rather than a "state officer," who by performing his
duties, serves the state as well as the county. In this connection see Ogle vs. Eckel, 49 Cal. App. 2d 599; 12 P 2d 67; Pelaez
v. State, 107 Fla. 50, 144 So. 364; Clark vs. Tracy, 95 Iowa, 410
64 NW 290, Finley vs. Ludwick, 137 Ohio St. 329, 29 NE 2d
959.
13
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II

IF THE ACTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF TOOELE COUNTY IN FIXING
THE SALARIES OF THE VARIOUS COUNTY OFFICERS
WAS NOT AUTHORIZED, THEN THE PLAINTIFF, AS
COUNTY ATTORNEY, IS NOT ENTITLED TO A SALARY BECAUSE NONE HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED.
Respondent respectfully submits that Section 19-13-14
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 34, Laws
of Utah 1945, is not a legislative declaration fixing the salaries of the officers of all counties in the state, but is merely
authorization for the respective boards of county commissioners
to fix the said salaries at not to exceed the prescribed maximums. Should it therefore be determined that the board of
County Commissioners of Tooele County had no authority to
fix the salary of appellant as county attorney under the aforesaid statutory provisions, he would be entitled to none because
none had been prescribed, and it is the universally recognized
rule that unless compensation is by law attached to the office,
none can be recovered by the officer holding such office. 43
Am. Jur. 134-5; 46 CJ 1014, 1015; Mecham on Public Officers, Sections 855, 856, p. 577; Throop on Public Officers, Sec.
446, p. 432.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the action of the board

of county commissioners of Tooele County in fixing the salary
14
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of appellant as county attorney at a figure less than the maximwn prescribed by the ptovisions of Section 19-13-14, as
amended, for the office of attorney in a county of the second
class was proper and in conformity with the Constitution and
Statutes of the State of Utah. The order of the district court
on pre-trial granting defendant's motion for dismissal of the
complaint, and dismissing the complaint with prejudice, should
therefore be affirmed with costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON,
ALLEN B. SORENSEN,
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Respondent
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